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Institutions of Environmental Democracy and Environmental Justice: The Case of Chile 
Introduction 
As a comparativist, searching for a framework for “comparative environmental politics” 
(as opposed to policy), I began studying the three “Principle 10 (P10)” environmental access 
rights (also known as the pillars of environmental democracy)i, first promulgated in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration.  Since the late 1990s, these P10 rights, “access to environmental information,” 
“access to participation,” and, “access to justice in environmental matters,” are globally seen as 
promoting transparent, inclusive, and accountable governance. Their greatest adoption success to 
date is the European Union’s (EU) 1998 Aarhus Convention, which the EU saw as a way to 
deepen democracy and sustainability, especially in new Central and Eastern member states. 
Now, the push for environmental access rights worldwide is being promoted by several UN-
related agencies, including the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). The have been working since 2012 on promoting a regionwide Convention for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, along with The Access Initiative (TAI), a transnational network of 
civil society groups.   I argue these access rights can be seen seem to be an institutional basis for 
promoting environmental democracy and justice as well as providing a framework for a subfield 
of comparative environmental politics.  
Studying the adoption and implementation of these rights through concrete institutions in 
Latin America is complex, given that it is a region marked, throughout its history, by power 
differentials and inequities, especially regarding conflicts over exploitation of and benefits from 
natural resources. It is not surprising then that in Latin America, environmental justice has 
become and integrating and mobilizing concept connecting environmental, social, ethical and 
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political dimensions of sustainability and development.  This concept helps researchers analyze 
the distribution and types of conflicts in the region that often puts the burdens of development 
impacts on the poorest, most discriminated against, and excluded areas and populations 
(Carothers 2008; Rasmussen and Pinho, 2016).  In a larger project, I am comparing Mexico and 
Chile’s adoption and implementation of environmental access rights to pursue justice, as well as 
recent attempts to negotiate a Principle 10 Convention for the entire Latin American and 
Caribbean Region. This specific paper focuses on the case of Chile. 
 I am interested in formal political institutions and define “P 10 institutions” as concrete 
political organizations and rules that states adopt to deploy environmental access rights. More 
specifically, for citizens to have the right to public environmental information, a state would 
need to have a Freedom of Information Act and often, an agency that provides the requested 
information or explains information denials. The most common institution promoting public 
participation in environmental matters is a national agency/service that oversees required public 
input in Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for large-scale public and private projects. 
Finally, access to justice in environmental matters requires at a minimum, citizen standing in 
court if the Access Right to Information or Participation are denied by a government. In lieu of 
individual citizen suits, environmental NGOs need standing to sue in court, a fact still not 
recognized globally. Many countries, including Chile are now adopting specialized 
environmental courts or tribunals. 
 In this paper, I define environmental justice as a procedural concept; this means not only 
that citizens live in a country that allows for these three rights but also makes it possible for 
relatively equitable employment of these rights by all citizens. For example, if groups of non-
dominant language speakers need project information or want to participate in an EIA, the state 
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must provide materials translated into the group’s language. Or, the cost of requesting 
information or gaining technical or legal expertise, should not be burdensome to a group that is 
considered minority or low-income. Thus, the literature discussing these three procedural rights 
and justice in numerous national settings maintain that not only the distributional dimension of 
environmental injustice, i.e. the disproportionate harm faced by the poor and minorities 
(Agyeman, Bullard, Evans, 2003) but also the disproportionate abilities of some groups over 
others to employ thee access rights  (e.g. Foti 2008; Pring and Pring 2016) must be addressed by 
governments.  In sum, to quote Chile’s Environmental Minister, Pedro Badenier: 
Greater and better access to information, to participation, and justice, will result in in 
greater legitimacy for each country’s system of environmental management, will help to 
anticipate and prevent environmental conflicts,and will facilitate more efficient 
management of projects and programs, whether public or private, thus increasing the 
level of protection of natural resources.ii 
 
Key Questions and Methods 
 Key research questions explored in this study are: 1) Why would individual countries (in 
this case, Chile) adopt Principle 10 access rights/institutions? 2)Is there an order of adoption?  
3)Once adopted, how are the rights/institutions implemented and monitored? 4)How successful 
have environmental movements been in deploying these rights. Finally, 5)how do these access 
rights/ institutions help deepen democracy and contribute to environmental justice? 
I use a qualitative methodology involving semi-structured interviews with numerous 
government bureaucrats as well as activists in environmental NGOs in Chile. I have also been 
guided, however, by the quantitative measures of the EDI put together by TAI and the World 
Resources Institute. Finally, I sketch out briefly in this work (but offer greater detail in the larger 
study) how these rights have worked in practice in some of the best known Chilean 
environmental justice conflicts.  Especially notable conflicts involve large-scale energy/dam 
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project (e.g. HydroAysén) or mining projects (e.g. Barick Gold’s Pascua-Lama project). Both 
projects were fought on both general environmental grounds and also on grounds of 
disproportionate harm to indigenous communities, thus raising basic environmental justice 
concerns. 
The Three Procedural Access Rights in Depth 
Pillar I: Access to Environmental Information 
The right to environmental information:   
has been characterized as a third wave of environmental governance or “regulation by 
revelation.” The first wave of environmental governance tools were command-and-
control, the second wave, market based mechanisms and this is the third (Florini 1998, 
57-58. 
To translate Pillar I, “Access to Environmental Information,” into a formal institution, countries 
need to adopt a Freedom of Information (FOI) Act.  Sweden is considered to be the first country 
to enact a Freedom of Information (FOI) law in 1766;iii  but in the modern era, the movement for 
access to public information began in 1948, in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The United States was the first country to adopt a modern Freedom of Information 
regime in 1966 under President Johnson. FOI laws are seen as a way to offer citizens 
transparency in government and thereby diminish corruption and enhance legitimacy.  Typically, 
they encompass two different strategies. The first involves” mandatory disclosure” in which 
public or some private entities must provide scheduled data disclosures on what they do. The 
second strategy involves citizens themselves taking the initiative to make specific information 
requests (Fox and Haight 2010, 137).   
The dilemma for governments, however, is that creating the constitutional or legal 
provisions of a FOIA, is only the first step. To implement an information act, officials must 
resolve several complex issues such as: what information is considered confidential and what 
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delivery mechanisms does the government use to provide information to the public?  
Governments must insure that the information is systematic, understandable to average citizens, 
and produced on a predictable timetable. At a minimum regarding environmental information, 
governments should produce State of the Environment Reports and create air and water quality 
monitoring systems (Foti 2008, 8). 
 Another innovation related to “access to environmental information” are what the United 
States calls “Toxic Release Inventories (TRIs),” and in most other countries called “Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Registries (PRTRs).”iv This instrument first appeared after several 
industrial accidents and nuclear plant mishaps in the 1970s along with an evolving sense that 
citizens needed information about the risks they were being asked to bear in their communities 
(Kraft, Stephan, Abel 2011:31).   
In 1986, the United States passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act (EPCRA). With this act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began 
requiring communities to create comprehensive emergency response systems, but it also created 
a national inventory of toxic releases that has become a worldwide model. The U.S. TRI 
mandates that information be made public by private industrial plants of a certain size that are 
releasing these toxins into the surrounding air, water, or as transfers to another site. Rather than 
containing a formal government sanctioning process, the TRI requires creating datasets that are 
standardized and publicly available, and will allow local communities, researchers, and activists 
to track and compare performance of industrial facilities and other businesses. Citizen groups 
and the media then can praise corporate leaders and shame laggards. The usefulness of PRTRs 
increasing numbers of countries have adopted them, and they also became part of the legally-
binding Kiev Protocol of the Aarhus Convention in 2003. Therefore, all European Union 
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members must have a PRTR, but the Protocol also incentivizes other countries to create one as 
well (www.unece.org). 
 Additional practices considered important for environmental information access instituted 
in the last three decades are to develop Prior Informed Consent or PIC - based programs that now 
typically govern trade in pesticides or hazardous waste. A second practice are private eco-
labeling schemes as found in forestry, fisheries, and organic food; these have been put in place to 
aid environmentally-conscious consumers. A third strategy involves corporate social 
responsibility-related voluntary initiatives, such as the Global Reporting Initiative, with private 
firms agreeing to report moves towards sustainability (UNITAR 2004; Gupta 2008).  Finally, 
civil society activists and researchers consider freedom of access to environmental information 
(e.g. as in “State of the Environment” reports) essential for measuring national compliance with 
the roughly 1,000 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that are now in force 
worldwide (Kanie et al. 2013).        
 By 2014, over 100 countries had adopted FOI laws, but their implementation must be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis to ascertain their actual impact (Worker and De Silva 2014).  
In Latin America, both ECLAC and the Organization of American States (OAS) have been 
pushing for a FOI laws throughout the region, arguing that access to public information is 
essential for transparent, democratic governance. Indeed, the OAS’s support for transparency and 
FOI laws started in 1991 first with its Unit, and then its Department for State Modernization and 
Governance. It viewed such laws as an essential means of addressing governmental corruption 
(Herz 2012).  In 2006, the OAS drafted a model FOI Law for the entire region to adopt. 
The OAS and other regional and international organizations have understood that 
economic and socio-cultural conditions in Latin America pose fundamental challenges to 
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achieving an effective socialization of environmental information. As a result, these IGOs and 
activists argue that it is crucial for countries to go beyond merely adopting a FOI law but also 
develop suitable capabilities and conditions for extending the coverage and reach of current 
access to information tools. By the end of 2015, twenty Latin American and Caribbean nations 
had adopted some kind of access to information requirement, also with concerns for making the 
information widely available (www.freedominfo.org). 
Pillar II: Access to Participation in Environmental Matters 
 After the 1992 Rio Conference, all United Nations summits related to sustainable 
development have promoted a model of participatory or bottom - up decisionmaking (Access to 
Participation). The oft-repeated argument is that only broad participation of groups will enhance 
the democratic legitimacy and public acceptance of decisions (Backstrand 2012). At its most 
basic, especially in poor or marginalized communities, access to public participation in 
environmental matters means: officials conduct and document meetings on proposed projects in 
language appropriate for the local community, participating bears little or no cost for attendees, 
and assistance is provided to local communities to understand the technical aspects of the 
project. 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are the most widely known instrument for 
providing a forum for public input; and again, the United States was the leader. The 1970 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandated that impact assessments would be 
required for large-scale projects with potential ecological consequences. A 1972 follow-up act 
strove to make the process less adversarial and to allow citizen input at various stages of project 
development. A large scholarly literature exists on public participation in bureaucratic reviews 
and the EIA process more specifically; however, after almost fifty years of research, authors 
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conclude that creating just and effective participation in impact assessments remains “a work in 
progress (e.g. Arnstein 1969; Fung 2006; Dietz and Stern 2008).” 
 One reason for the present study procedural access rights in Latin America and especially 
access to participation is that in the last roughly two decades, the region has been the epicenter of 
participatory initiatives (Cameron, Hershberg and Sharp 2012). Yet studies specifically on 
participation in environmental decisionmaking are rare; and this gap is all the more glaring since 
conflicts over natural resource exploitation and the environmental impact of development 
projects, more generally, are among the key issues animating Latin American politics at present. 
 Notably, international and regional organizations have been in the forefront in promoting 
environmental participation in Latin America. Perhaps the first example (although not 
necessarily promoted as “access to environmental participation,” but a nod towards participation 
in marginalized communities) is the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention 169 of 
1989. This convention, generally characterized as an international human rights/indigenous 
rights instrument, needs a special mention is because of its increasing use in Latin America. ILO 
169, as it is commonly known, is the first international treaty recognizing the inalienable rights 
of indigenous and tribal peoples regarding development of their lands and natural resources.v In 
the first two decades of the Twenty-first century, Latin America has experienced a major 
commodity boom causing intensified pressure on arable land and natural resources. Major new 
investments in agriculture, mining, oil, gas, and timber have impacted and infringed upon 
indigenous territories. 
 As of 2016, twenty-two countries had ratified ILO Convention 169, with fifteen of the 
ratifiers coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. The most important feature of ILO 169 
has been the requirement of Free, Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) or consulta previa, in Spanish.  
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Yet, globally, states have struggled to define and implement this vaguely - worded right, with 
perhaps, the most contentious question not fully answered—does prior consultation allow for a 
veto over potential projects on which they are being consulted?  In sum, “realizing this difficult 
but important right will require clear, objective, and effective state presence—often in territories 
where the state has effectively been absent (Sabatini 2014, 3).” 
Pillar III: Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
Access to justice requires all levels of governments to establish institutions and 
procedures involving courts or some other impartial deliberating body to adjudicate individual 
and NGO claims of denial of rights to information or participation. The three access rights are 
widely viewed as interdependent; and access to justice strengthens the first two rights. In general, 
Pillar III reforms, which pose major challenges to national judicial systems, have been slow to be 
adopted (Rose-Ackerman and Halpaap 2001).  
Access to justice is a vital aspect of accountability since it provides venues for 
enforcement of procedural and substantive environmental rights and duties.  Access to justice in 
the context of environmental decisionmaking can: 1)strengthen freedom of information, 2)allow 
citizens to participate meaningfully and appropriately, 3)level the playing field by empowering 
the previously unempowered to seek redress in courts and other forums, and  4)increase the 
public’s ability to seek redress and remedy for environmental harm (Foti 2008, 37). Obviously, 
seeking justice through the judicial branch can only function if the courts are sufficiently free of 
political influence. 
To begin to give substance to this right, a wide range of individuals and groups must have 
legal standing before courts and administrative bodies to participate in environmental cases. 
Citizens must have the right of appeal or review by a higher governmental authority or (when 
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relevant) to alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. They also must have the right to have 
public officials who are independent in matters of implementation, appeals, and oversight.  
Finally, governments must provide access environmental justice at a reasonable cost; there 
should be no financial barriers to litigation (e.g. UNITAR-UNECE (2004: 49). 
 Again, the United States has been a model for the spreading norm of “access to justice in 
environmental matters.” The 1946 Administrative Procedures Act gave Federal courts a direct 
roleto help enforce bureaucratic agency obligations. The public could request that the courts 
review agency decisions.  Furthermore, the United States provided a global environmental 
precedent when the court broadened its notion of “standing to sue” in the Scenic Hudson case of 
1965.vi With this case, United States became the first country to recognize legal standing for 
groups of citizens suing on behalf of the environment. It also became the springboard for the 
modern specialty of environmental law and modern U.S. environmental legislation such as the 
1970 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  Importantly, the 1970 law not only expanded 
citizens’ right to sue on behalf of the environment but also to sue for procedural violations in 
formulating environmental impact assessments (Gellers 2011; Foti, 2008, 11.) 
 Globally “standing to sue in environmental matters,” remains a contentious issue. In 
many countries, even in those with a legal “Right to a Healthy Environment,” citizens may have 
to prove direct harm by environmental degradation. Jurisdictions vary on whether individuals or 
groups can sue in the public interest or whether it is possible to sue for violation of certain 
collective rights belonging to, for example, indigenous or tribal groups. These are only the most 
common issues in determining “who,” specifically, has the right to sue for justice. Pring and 
Pring, in Greening Justice (2009), have compiled the most comprehensive global overview of 
“access to justice” institutions and cited about 350 worldwide. Their overall finding is that 
11 | P a g e  
 
although the world community agreed to provide access to justice at the 1992 Rio Conference, 
most citizens still lack access to courts and remedies for environmental complaints. 
Turning to Latin America, overall judicial reform has been a part of the two-pronged 
push for both democratic consolidation and economic reform in these Third Wave democracies. 
Yet, for the most part, the region remains in the early stages of creating an independent judiciary.  
Historically, Latin America’s judiciary had been considered the least independent of any region 
in the world (Payne et al. 2007, 118- 119). Only in the last twenty-five years that Latin American 
courts have started to become central players in many of the region’s political system (Helmke 
2004, Hibbink 2007, Brinks 2007). This increasing activism owes to the introduction of recent 
notions into the region’s law school curriculum, of the global doctrine that human rights are 
central to constitutionalism.  
Moving specifically to the emerging varieties of environmental courts and tribunals 
appearing around the world, by 2016, Pring and Pring found roughly 1,200 courts or tribunals in 
forty-four countries.  By 2016, the Latin American and Caribbean region had eleven 
environmental courts or tribunals with more in the planning stage (OAS 2015).  
Standing to sue on behalf of the environment raises a difficult issue in many judicial 
systems. As Pring and Pring (2009) write: 
Standing is a non-issue when three things are clear: the plaintiff’s injury, defendant’s 
causation, and the court’s ability to provide an effective a n effective remedy. But 
environmental harms are seldom so clear (34). 
       
Indeed, it is still uncommon for individuals or groups to sue on behalf of the environment in 
Latin America. It helps if the country has a constitutional “right to a healthy environment,” 
which some countries do have. It also helps if the country has experienced environmental law 
firms.  Finally, it helps if countries have Environmental Management tools that incorporate Pillar 
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III access rights (and some LAC countries have them), such as: alternative dispute resolution and 
other administrative justice mechanisms such as planning councils and specialized bodies with 
environmental jurisdiction.  
The Environment-Development Nexus in Chile: A Brief Historical Overview  
Chile’s economy, like others in Latin America, has been tied to natural resource 
exploitation from its founding to the present. It has large deposits of copper, iron ore, nitrates, 
precious metals, molybdenum, a major timber industry, and with hydropower as its only 
domestic source of energy. Not surprisingly, then, since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, but 
with a continued neoliberal economic orientation, political conflicts are frequently related to 
resource extraction.vii  More recently, conflicts are also related to the energy-infrastructure 
projects, especially dams, required to power the growing economy. An overall environmental 
assessment shows that Chile suffers from widespread deforestation, the numerous harmful 
effects of strip mining, overfishing, overuse of chemicals in the fruit belt, air pollution from 
industrial and vehicle emissions, and water pollution from raw sewage. Furthermore, the country 
experiences severe earthquakes, significant volcanic activity, forest fires, and tsunamis, so that 
Chilean citizens need a state-of-the-art emergency preparedness system. 
 It is essential to review Chile’s recent political history to understand why economic 
growth has, until recently, greatly outweighed concerns for environmental protection, until quite 
recently.  To summarize, Chile had a long democratic but elitist tradition; by the mid-twentieth 
century, the party system had crystalized into right, center, and left coalitions. Between 1970 and 
1973 the leftist coalition was in power headed by the Socialist president, Salvador Allende. Both 
internal and external pressures contributed to escalating instability in the 1970-1973 period; and 
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on the “other September 1,” President Allende was overthrown by a military junta lead by 
General Augusto Pinochet.  
The Pinochet regime remade the Chilean economy as a neoliberal model, emulated in 
much of Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and parts of Central and Eastern Europe at the 
end of the Cold War. Chile’s democratic regime was outlawed for seventeen years, until the 
transitional election of 1989.  Patricio Aylwin of the Center-left Concertación por la 
Democracia (commonly known as Concertación) won that election, and the Concertación kept 
winning every election until 2010, when the center-right Alianza took the presidency for four 
years (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2014). In December 2014, Michele Bachelet (who had been 
president in the 2006-2010 term), was reelected. She now headed a coalition that had changed its 
name to Nueva Mayoría, and included the Communist Party  Importantly, since the 1990 return 
to democracy, Chile has continued it neoliberal economic path started in the Pinochet era, albeit 
in a more moderate form. 
The task now is to examine Chilean environmental politics in the contemporary era and 
especially the adoption and implementation of procedural access rights, the institutions of 
environmental democracy and justice.  While the main focus is on the post-1990 period, some 
understanding of Chilean environmentalism in earlier decades may be helpful. A small Chilean 
environmental movement that first appeared in the 1960s and early 1970s, mirroring the growth 
of environmental movements worldwide at this time. Some minor environmental activism 
occurred the 1980s during the years of the military junta, but the government’s nearly total 
embrace of a neoliberal ideology, “relegated environmentalism to the margins both culturally 
and politically (Carruthers, 2001, 351).viii  
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Essentially, environmentalists had no voice until the political transition began in the late 
1980s. The first significant environmental gathering occurred in 1989 with “The First National 
Meeting of Environmental Action organizations,” to prepare for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. 
After the euphoria of the transition to civilian government, the movement soon lost steam, 
similar to much of the rest of Chilean social movements (Kurtz 2004). 
Perhaps any action towards environmental protection after the Pinochet era would be a 
positive change.  Eduardo Silva (1997), David Carruthers (2001), and Kathryn Hochstetler 
(2012) examined Chilean environmental politics pre- and post - Pinochet; and while all authors 
agree that democracy is better for environmental protection, than the military junta, at least Silva 
and Carruthers warn that environmental institutions and practices inherited from the authoritarian 
era were not simple to overcome.  According to Carruthers, environmental policy, institutions, 
and participation have continued to be shaped by ominous legacies from history, dictatorship, 
and an economic orthodoxy inimical to sustainability (2001, 343). Hochstetler 
suggests/concludes that democratization has been “necessary but not sufficient, as a driving force 
for environmental protection” in Chile, and throughout the region (2012, 217).  
Institutionalizing Environmental Democracy in Chile 
  In 2016, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) Report 
on Chile noted:  
During the last decade, Chile has made remarkable progress in strengthening its 
environmental institutions and policy framework, as recommended by the 2005 OECD 
Environmental Performance Review…. However, the environmental benefits of 
institutional reforms are lagging behind; rigorous implementation is needed to tackle 
environmental pressures as Chile’s income level continues to catch up with the OECD 
average (OECD 2016, 17). 
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What follows is the story of environmental institution-building amid anti-regulatory historical 
legacies to explain why this economically high-performing OECD member has been slow in 
implementing the environmental institutions of democracy and justice. 
As of 1990, the democratically-elected Concertación government moved to create a more 
integrated legal and institutional environmental framework. Yet even under this center-left 
government, economic growth was by far the privileged policy concern as it hoped to continue as 
Latin America’s most successful economy.  From 1990-2010, Concertación presidents operated 
in a political culture that has prized conflict avoidance in hopes of avoiding an authoritarian 
reversal; thus politicians moved slowly in promoting reforms other than those that would 
enhance neoliberalism, (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006). 
Still the Concertación wanted to begin to improve sustainability policies and established 
a bureaucracy in 1990, the Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente (CONAMA) to begin the 
task. In 1994, Congress created an overarching legal framework Ley No. 19.300 Ley de Bases 
Generales del Medio Ambiente (LBGMA), in 1994, and in this law, CONAMA was given wider 
responsibilities. This agency would have a central directorate and decentralized regional 
commissions (Comisiones regionals del Medio Ambiente (COREMAS). Now CONAMA would 
oversee initiatives in environmental education and research, public participation, environmental 
quality standards to preserve flora, fauna, and their habitat, emissions standards, liability for 
environmental damage, and an environmental impact assessment system.  
 Related to creating procedural access rights, the 1994 framework law mandated popular 
participation in formulating environmental policy, particularly in terms of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs).  Assessing these institutions in the early years of their operation, however, 
Carruthers noted at that time, a wide gap remained between the formal legislation and how it was 
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implemented on the ground, including participation in the EIA process (2001, 349).  Again, 
writing a decade after the democratic transition, Carruthers continues:   
…the austere neoliberal state offers chronically limited funding to environmental 
institutions whose leaders likewise lack political clout. Government officials concede the 
paucity of the most basic environmental infrastructure – scarce water treatment, virtually 
no limits on the discharge of pollutants, no limits on toxic pesticides, no certified dumps 
for industrial or mining waste, no ‘right-to-know’ laws, and so forth (349). 
 
Eduardo Silva  came to a similar conclusion, that at least in the first decade after the 
transition, neoliberalism trumped sustainable conservation in Chile’s environmental policy 
(1997, 60). Silva drew his conclusions after focusing on Chile’s southern native forests, the 
epicenter of an extremely profitable forestry industry and the government’s non-conservation 
approach, becoming a growing area of contention. 
The Role of Supranational Organizations in Promoting Environmental Democracy in Chile 
While NGOs concerned about the environment, public participation or both were beginning to 
find their voice, the initial impetus to create and empower environmental institutions came from 
external sources, that is, supranational organizations. Certainly these external organizations help 
to energize domestic environmental NGOs and social movements. One possible place to start is 
in Free Trade agreements (FTAs) that Chile signed with developed countries, given that the 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with its accompanying environmental 
requirements had become at least an early model for other trade agreements (GAO 2009, 
Danemeier 2011, Jinnah 2016)   Chile’s first modern Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was with 
Canada (1996); and before Chile signed with United States in 2004, it had agreements with 
Mexico (1998), the European Union (2002), and South Korea (2004). While these FTAs 
contained some environmental obligations for Chile and may have prompted some minor 
environmental adjustments, by far, the main driver of Chile’s adopting modern environmental 
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governance structures was the country’s desire to join the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Negotiations with the organization occurred throughout 
the first presidential term of Michelle Bachelet, and Chile became one of only two Latin 
American members in May 2010 (Mexico joined in 1994).ix Finally, while the OECD and other 
regional and international governmental organizations were the primary drivers pressuring Chile 
to adopt these environmental access reforms, reforms, domestic NGOs and social movements 
were quick to made them part of their toolkit. 
  A )Pillar One: Access to Public Information 
During President Bachelet’s first term, Chile created its Transparency and Access to 
Public Information law 20.285), which took effect in 2009 (Michener 2009). Here, perhaps the 
primary organization pushing for this law was not the OECD but rather the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (IACHR). Its ruling in Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile (2006) focused on the 
matter of Chile’s excessive governmental secrecy. Chile had to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the court since, as an early step in its democratization, it had signed on a State 
Party to the Inter- American Court in1990.  
Briefly, Claude Reyes was initiated in 1998 and involved several prominent Chilean 
NGOs (e.g. Pro-Acceso and Participa) that requested publicly - held information on a proposed 
forestry project. The plaintiffs had requested documents from the government’s Foreign 
Investment Committee about the Trillium Forestry Company and its proposed Rio Condor 
project. The project would have involved major deforestation in Chile’s southernmost Region 
XII, but the government felt no need to provide the requested information. In September 2006, 
the Inter-American Court found that the state had refused the request without providing any valid 
reason for the refusal under Chilean law; and the court ordered the government to adopt specific 
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measures to address information requests as well as pay for the plaintiffs’ costs to bring the case. 
Unsurprisingly, as a response to the court ruling and her government’s rapidly declining 
popularity, President Bachelet announced her support for an Access to Information law in late 
2006. More generally, Claude Reyes has had a regionwide impact in promoting national access 
to information laws.x  
In case the president needed further reasons to support an information law, the Chilean 
Constitutional Court decided in Casas Cordero et al. v. The National Customs Service, August 9, 
2007, that Chileans had a right of access to information.xi Thus, given the OECD’s requirement 
of a FOI law for membership, regional and domestic court rulings, and President Bachelet’s 
support, in 2009, the Chilean government created Law 20.285, the Right to Public Information 
lawt o be administered by a newly-created Consejo para la Transparencia (Transparency 
Council).          
The good news for Chile is that the Transparency Council reported that between April 
2009-November 2016 it received over 17,500 complaints of denial of public information. In 79% 
of cases, the Council either totally or partially agreed with the plaintiff and the plaintiff received 
information; in the same period, 262 public officials received financial sanctions. From these 
data and from interviews, Chile’s Transparency Council seems to be working fairly well.    
Perhaps some of the explanation, and a sign of good faith from the government, is that its first 
Commissioner, Juan Pablo Almedo, came out of the NGO community, having headed the group, 
Participa.  
Yet problems remain. While the law has represented a great step forward in a country 
with little history of governmental transparency or accountability, it had weak points. First it 
only covers information from the Executive branch; the Legislative and Judicial branches are 
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under no transparency obligations. Also significantly, as Delamaza (2014) points out, in Chile, 
the bulk of information related to environmental matters (e.g. resource exploitation) is in private 
hands and not covered by the transparency law. A second problem under “access to information” 
relates to emergency preparedness and community-right-to-know measures. This is a highly 
sensitive issue in Chile, a country subject to many natural disasters, especially earthquakes and 
tsunamis. This became a serious issue for the outgoing Bachelet administration in 2010 when an 
earthquake and major tsunami hit the coast with over 150 killed. The government was blamed for 
failing to give adequate tsunami warning (as well as failing to marshal an adequate response to 
the resulting devastation). These failures were used against Bachelet as she ran for President 
again in 2013. (Sigmund 2014, 146).   Finally, Chile has published PRTR reports since the mid-
2000s, but the OECD suggests that the country collect more and better statistics as required by 
international organizations and international conventions (OECD 2016, 28).  
Restructuring Chile’s Environmental Governance in 2010 
 Given Chile’s desire to join the OECD, in addition to creating a FOI law, the Bachelet 
administration initiated a comprehensive overhaul of the country’s environmental management.  
The result was the 2010 legislation amending the 1994 General Environmental Framework Law 
(19.300). The new law (20.417) contained four major institutional reforms. It established for the 
first time, 1) a Ministry of the Environment, 2) an inter-agency Council of Ministers for 
Sustainability, 3) an Inspectorate or Superintendencia, and 4) an Environmental Evaluation 
Service. Finally, the 2010 amendments called for establishing three environmental courts in 
Chile. This ultimately happened with another law, 20.600, passed by Congress in 2012. 
In addition to proposing policy, the Environmental Ministry oversees distribution of eight 
types of environmental information (including data from monitoring activities such as the 
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country’s PRTR adopted in 2005; information on international environmental treaties signed by 
the government; all domestic environmental laws; State of the Environment reports; and final 
decisions of the environmental tribunals).  It also coordinates the Council of Ministers and their 
regional offices. The Council of Ministers is supposed to balance the country’s need for 
environmental protection with the need to promote economic growth.  The Environmental 
Inspectorate or Superintendencia is charged with overseeing compliance with laws and 
regulations, while the Environmental Evaluation Service is tasked with ensuring public 
participation in Environmental Impact Studies (EIS) and Environmental Declarations (EIDs). 
The three environmental courts exist to ensure access to justice when the other access rights have 
been infringed upon.  
B} Pillar Two: Access to Public Participation 
 Any measure that would promote public participation in Chile is sorely needed. 
Perceptions of meaningful participatory opportunities are important for bestowing legitimacy for 
formal institutions and support for specific policies.xii  Although Chileans have experienced a 
high degree of political stability in recent decades, citizens are deeply disillusioned with primary 
mechanisms (other than elections) to influence policy.  The major change regarding participation 
in in the 2010 environmental law was that the new, innovative, semi-autonomous, Environmental 
Evaluation Service (SEA) would expand the types of projects requiring participation in impact 
assessments. While the 1994 law, 19.300, required public participation only in large projects 
(EIS), now smaller projects requiring declarations of impact (EID) might also require public 
participation if public officials decided it necessary.  Furthermore, post-2010, the Environmental 
Evaluation Service was now required to take account of public comments and studies, and its 
decisions are subject to appeal. Additionally, the Service is required to consider social, economic 
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cultural, and geographic characteristics of communities affected by a project and make 
participation accessible to vulnerable, geographically isolated, or indigenous communities.xiii  
Yet, Chile still has a deficit in terms of facilitating participation in environmental impacts. Legal 
scholar, Matias Guiloff Titiun (2015), shows that since the 2010 law’s enactment, the majority of 
impact statements are considered declaraciones, which means they do not require citizen 
participation project assessment,xiv and the 2016 OECD Report on Chile notes: 
The existing provisions for public participation in the EIA process do not ensure adequate 
of project alternatives or minimization of potential envtl impacts, which may potentially 
lead to environmental and social conflicts (27).xv 
 
 Finally, Chile’s experience with and ILO 169, covering participation rights of indigenous 
people in development projects, deserves a brief discussion.  While ILO 169 was first proposed 
in 1989, it took Chile took twenty more years to put in place in 2009.xvi  Christopher Sabatini  
notes, somewhat counterintuitively, the countries that have made the greatest advances in sorting 
out the vagaries of “the right to prior consultation” to date, have not been the ones most 
rhetorically committed to indigenous rights (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), but those 
most committed to neoliberalism and investor rights (e.g. Chile, Colombia, and Peru) (2014, 3).” 
In Chile, by law, the two government agencies that oversee prior consultations are the 
National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI) and the Environmental Evaluation 
Service (SEA). In theory, CONADI’s task is to provide technical assistance to indigenous 
communities (about 1 million Chileans identify with an indigenous ethnic group) while the SEA 
remit is to facilitate, more generally, citizen participation in evaluating the environmental 
impacts In practice, however, this division of labor has been unclear.  
 Early in her second administration (2014-2018), President Bachelet pledged to create a 
more institutionalized and transparent prior consultation process with indigenous communities.  
22 | P a g e  
 
Starting around 2000, these communities have shown determined resistance to the government’s 
mining and hydropower ventures on their lands. At present, the results on citizen participation 
and, more specifically, on indigenous participation in environmental matters remains decidedly 
mixed.xvii  One key analyst of general trends in Chilean citizen participation (Delamaza 2014) 
argues that after the citizen protects starting in 2011, there has some widening of the space for 
debate on citizen participation and feels somewhat optimistic that the space will continue to 
widen. Still, he would probably agree with Teckler, Bauer and Prieto (2011) and Montoya (2014) 
that that indigenous Chileans do not have effective participation rights through either national 
legislation or through ILO 169.              
C) Pillar Three: Access to Justice 
Under Chile’s 2012 law 20.600, Congress authorized creation of three environmental 
courts. Such specialized courts have begun to appear around the world in, roughly, the last 
quarter century, but are still seen as novel in the pursuit of access to environmental justice. 
Interestingly, after passage of the 2010 Environmental law, demands for environmental courts 
(seemingly a way to promote both procedural and substantive environmental justice) actually 
were initiated by the exceptionally powerful business community. Business leaders wanted to 
have a way to litigate potentially burdensome environmental regulations. 
The three courts were designated for Antofagasta, Santiago, and Valdivia; but they are 
meant to cover all of Chile.  As of this writing (April 2017), only the Santiago and Valdivia were 
operating.  Each court is to have three judges appointed by the President, along with Senate 
approval. The Court is comrised of both lawyers and scientific experts (common in these kinds 
of courts, e.g. Pring and Pring 2009); but a major innovation in Chile is use of amicus curiae 
briefs in proceedings (Ferrada Bórquez 2015). In addition to claims of simple denials of access to 
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participation in impact assessments, the courts hear cases on compensation for environmental 
damage, challenges to rulings of the Committee of Ministers or the Executive Director of 
Environmental Evaluation Service when no environmental impact assessment was conducted, 
implementation of emissions or environmental quality standards, and complaints against 
administrative decisions that annul environmental regulations (UNEP 2015, 108; Muñoz Gajardo 
2014, 17-38).  While these reforms represent moves toward wider access to justice in Chile, the 
OECD notes that in reality, “the high cost of legal counsel often puts this access out of reach of 
NGOs and private citizens (2016, 28).” 
Analysis 
These above outlined access rights are increasingly becoming the global norm in 
domestic environmental governance, and, indeed, for environmental justice. Making these rights 
meaningful in the Chilean case is essential since Chile ranked ninth of seventy-six countries 
examined worldwide and fourth in Latin America in terms of environmental conflicts (OECD 
2016, 15). Chile’s environmental conflicts overwhelmingly involve energy transmission and 
mining projects. At this point, we simply note Chile’s Environmental Democracy scores from the 
World Resources Institute’s Environmental Democracy Index (EDI). The country received a 
score of 1.89 for “access to information” and 1.88 for “access to justice.” Both are considered 
“good.” In contrast, the country received a 1.24 for “access to participation,” a score considered 
only “fair” for a high-income OECD country (www.environmentaldemocracyindex.org). 
To make our discussion of environmental democracy and environmental justice in Chile 
more concrete, we briefly examine some major environmental struggles, the citizen groups 
involved and their use of access rights, and the outcomes to date. The most notable conflicts have 
taken place in indigenous territories and typically involve dam or mining projects. While Chile 
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has embraced renewable, hydropower, project development has primarily targeted the country’s 
southern region.  An early dam project that galvanizing major opposition was Endesa’sxviii 
RALCO Dam (which went into operation 2004), near Temuco in Chile’s Biobió region. 
Significantly, this project was developed before the government adopted the three procedural 
access rights. In hopes of preventing other projects in what became known as a watershed 
conflict area, a mix of environmentalists and Mapuche rights activists formed the Citizen Action 
Network for Environmental Rights (Red de Acción por los Derechos Ambientales or RADA) in 
2005. In 2006, it became the Interregional Action Network for Environmental and Social Justice 
(Red de Acción por la Justicia Ambiental RAJAS).  
Key strategies used by the network since the mid-2000s have been to explicitly link these 
environmental struggles with human rights discourses and allusions to past colonial abuses 
(Urkidi and Walter 2011; Montoya 2014). This network and others that formed around other 
environmental protests have used the now classic “boomerang strategy (Keck and Sikking 1998) 
to successfully stop some projects but not others.  It should be noted that the push for procedural 
environmental access rights was, at least in part, pushed by early defeats such as the RALCO 
dam. 
HydroÁysen was the watershed conflict project that has received the most international 
coverage and notoriety to date. This was a $10 billion project of Endesa first proposed in 2005. It 
would have been the country’s largest energy project in its history consisting of five huge dams 
on two rivers, the Baker and Pascua, in Patagonia. This area of South-Central Chile is not only 
Mapuche territory but it is also an area renowned for its natural beauty. In return for permitting 
the project on their ancestral lands, Mapuche leaders demanded the return of approximately one 
million acres of territory. Ultimately, after a decade of protest, the jailing of Mapuche activists, 
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and global negative publicity, the Chilean government backed away from this project in 2014. 
Leaders of the NGO, Patagonia Defense Council, called the decision the greatest win for Chile’s 
environmental movement, where an empowered public was allowed to participate in decisions 
that affect their environment and their lives (Edwards and Roberts 2015, 56-57).xix  
A final project relevant for this study is Barrick Gold’s Pascua-Lama project in the 
northern part of the country. This Canadian firm, the largest gold mining company in the world 
began, project negotiations in 1994 and broke ground in 1999. In 2000, Chile and Argentina 
signed a treaty 2000 to allow cross-national collaboration in the mine development with 75% of 
the concession on the Chilean side and 25% on the Argentine side. Project opponents cited  the 
normal threats associated with mining, the threat of toxic waste for the area’s water and soil and 
cultural threats to Diaguita indigenous communities, In addition to these  general risks, however, 
were environmentalists’ special concerns about exploration and extraction in the High Andes, 
potential earthquakes and threats to glaciers that provide the region’s water. 
 After conducting an EIA, Chile’s environmental agency at the time, CONAMA, signed 
off on the project in 2006. The Diaguita (Indigenous) Agricultural Communities claimed they did 
not have adequate participation in the decision including discussions for FPIC (as required by 
ILO 169); and in 2007, submitted their case to the I-A Commission on Human Rights (M 
Serrano 316-320). The project has been delayed for almost two decades, but in 2015, the Chilean 
Environmental court gave permission for the project, now smaller and a joint - venture between 
two companies, Barick and Goldcorp, to proceed.  
Conclusion  
The first intent of this study has been to contribute to an understanding of procedural 
environmental democracy, especially to attain environmental justice; it is also meant to offer one 
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framework for the comparative study of environmental politics. Studying the adoption and 
implementation of procedural environmental rights and institutions at the national level, will 
allow comparativists interested in these topics (information, participation, and legal remedies) to 
build systematically on each other’s work. To date, comparative politics researchers have 
provided hundreds if not thousands of studies on environmental issues/conflicts around the 
world, but have not necessarily asked similar questions or explored similar hypotheses to build 
theory. Furthermore, there is a clear overlap with International Relations and legal scholars 
studying Environmental Human Rights.xx While these scholars are anchoring their work in 
international human rights treaties and the growing numbers of constitutions calling for the 
“right to a healthy environment,” these studies and those of comparativists can reciprocally 
enrich each scholarly track. 
Studying procedural environmental democracy will also allow researchers to comment on 
democratic deepening, useful in the Chilean case and in other Third Wave democracies. We 
asked questions here but only began to find the answers. It was only in the 2000s that 
environmental and environmental justice conflicts begin to appear.  It is not than 
environmentally harmful activities only began at this time, but rather that after the 1990 
transition, it took time for Chilean NGOs and social movements to “get up to speed.” Through 
the first post-transition decade, Chilean social movements and civil society remained weak and 
fragmented (Luna and Maradones, 2010, 114-15).  It is, perhaps, obvious but important to 
emphasize is that procedural environmental rights typically have not simply given by 
governments; they are granted after years of citizens demands or when the state is being when 
being incentivized by an International Organization, such as the OECD in the case of Chile. Now 
that Chilean ngos and environmental movements have gained in strength, however, the main 
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question is “how successful have Chilean NGOs environmental movements been in employing 
the relatively recently legislated environmental access in rights in blocking or modifying projects 
that might cause major environmental impact, environmental injustice, or both?”  
To conclude, we have provided a potential framework for comparativists studying 
environmental conflicts, including environmental justice conflicts. We have also provided what, 
somewhat surprisingly, may be an optimistic case study of a country with a neoliberal ideology 
that while slow in institutionalizing environmental protection and access rights, is in some ways 
now a regional leader. After the Rio+20 UN Environment and Development Conference in 2012, 
Chile became the lead state in pushing for an Aarhus-type Convention for the Latin American 
and Caribbean region. Surely Chilean social movements employing newly-acquired access rights 
explains some of the change. 
 
ENDNOTES 
i  Kofi A. Annan. 2000. “Forward.” The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, by S Stec and S Casey-
Lefkowitz with J. Jendroska. United Nations: New York and Geneva. 
ii P. Badenier speech, Fifth Negotiating Session for ECLAC Regional Convention on Environmental Access Rights, 
Santiago, Chile, Nov. 21, 2016, http://negociacionp10.cepal.org.  
iii Sweden’s “Act on the Freedom of Publishing and the Right of Access to Official Documents” of 1776 is considered 
the world’s first Freedom of Information Law. See, UNITAR and UNECE, Preparing a National Profile, p.1). 
iv In Spanish, they are called Registros de Emisiones y Transferencia de Contaminaciones (RETCs). 
v v http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm. 
vi Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2nd 608 (1963-1981). 
vii Much of Latin American historical analysis has focused on the role of natural resource exploitation in the colonial 
era as well as in constructing modern nation states in the region (Leff 1994, Alimonda 2011). 
viii Although on paper, Chile was an innovator in the region in that its 1980 constitution gave its citizens “the right 
to live in an environment free of contamination,” this right was essentially meaningless at the time, given the 
military junta’s ideological approach to unbridled economic growth. 
ix Several interviews with UN ECLAC officials in Santiago between 2012 1nd 2016. 
x In April 2010, the Organization of American States (OAS) Commission on Juridical and Political Issues promulgated 
a model “Access to Information” law. Based on the Claude Reyes finding that “access to information is part of the 
fundamental human right to free expression,” the OAS’s General Assembly approved adoption of FOI laws for all of 
Latin American countries/in June of that year.  
xi Statistics found at www.consejotransparencia.cl. 
xii  Rhodes-Purdy, 2017, 265-269. 
xiii UNEP 2015, Putting P10 in Action, 79. 
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xiii In January 2016, Delamaza was named by Michelle Bachelet to a presidential panel, el Consejo de la 
Participación Ciudadana y Fortalecimiento a la Sociedad Civil, to promote citizen participation.   
xiii (Luna and Maradones 2010, 114-115; 
xiv In a personal interview, Guiloff Titiun also expressed concern about another new environmental agency, 
Servicios de Biodiversidad. The fear was that with increased natural resource-based projects and projects involving 
infrastructure expansion, the cause of biodiversity protection was at risk.   
xv Also see, Costa Cordella and Fuentes Merino (2011). 
xviCEPAL (overseeing negotiations for the LAC P10 Convention) notes similarities between the LAC regional 
agreement and the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, approved in September 2015.Both emphasize the 
“virtuous circle” involving access rights, environmental protection, and human rights  The documents stress that 
“informed participation and transparency contribute to improving environmental policies and, therefore, 
environmental protection, which in turn enables compliance with substantive rights such as the right of every 
person to a healthy environment, to life and health (http://negociacionp10.cepal.org 21 June 2016.” 
xvii Indigenous Chileans have had more success participating on issues such as bilingual-bicultural education rather 
than on issues involving socio-environmental conflicts (Delamaza 2014). 
xvii Endesa is a subsidiary of the Italian Company, ENEL.  
xviiiEdwards and Roberts offer an interesting “take” on this case that highlights the ambiguity of this case. Clearly it 
was a win for environmental justice but a possible loss for climate change mitigation. Scholars must further unpack 
the sometime competing virtuous policy goals of environmental justice and effective policy to combat climate.   
HidroÁysen would have provided 15-20% of Chile’s energy needs. While Chile has a potential for other types of 
renewable energy (solar, geothermal, and wave and tidal) it remains energy-poor and relies on imported natural 
gas. 
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